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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Taxation of Life Insurance Proceeds Under Section 22(b) (1)
of the Internal Revenue Code
Insured took out a "Whole Life Policy" for $100,000. The policy
bestowed upon the insured the right to select one of three settlement
options, or upon the beneficiary if the insured had not exercised such
right. Insured died without having selected any of the options, and
beneficiary chose option C, which provided that she was to have the
whole or any part of the proceeds of the policy at the death of the
insured paid in either 10, 15, 20, or 25 stipulated payments based upon
a mortality table.'* If the beneficiary should survive the number of
installments selected, similar installments were to be continued during
her lifetime. Should she die before the total installments were paid,
the remaining installments were to be commuted and paid to her estate.
Under option C the beneficiary chose to have the proceeds paid in
120 monthly installments over a 10-year period, amounting to $597
monthly.2 * During 1940 the beneficiary received from the insurance
company $6,294, consisting of 10 monthly installments of $597 each,
with the last nine of these installments increased by monthly dividends
of $36 each. She reported this income as non-taxable for the year.
The life insurance company, in accordance with Treasury Regulations,
filed with the Treasury Department Form 1099, reporting $2,009.51
of the sum paid beneficiary as "Taxable Portion of Total Paid under
Supplementary Contracts." This sum now claimed to be taxable by
the Commissioner under Treasury Regulations 103, Section 19.22(b)
(1)-13* is obtained as follows:
'*Age of Beneficiary Number of Installments Stipulated
10 15 20 25
58 $70.67 $65.24 $59.29 $53.65
The table applies pro rata per $1,000 of the amount to be so paid.
2*8.45 per cent of 100 times $70.67 with cents omitted.
', "Life insurance-Amounts paid by reason of the death of the insured.-The
proceeds of life insurance policies, paid by reason of the death of an insured to
his estate or to a beneficiary (individual, partnership, or corporation), directly or
in trust, are excluded from the gross income of the beneficiary, except in the
case of certain transferees as provided in section 19.22(b) (2) (A) -3 and in the
case of a spouse to whom such payments are income under section 22(k). If,
however, such proceeds are held by the insurer under an agreement to pay interest
thereon, the interest payments must be included in gross income. In the case of
a beneficiary to whom payments are made in installments pursuant to an option
exercised by such beneficiary, the amount exempted is the amount payable imme-
diately after the death of the insured had such beneficiary not elected to exercise
an option to receive the proceeds of the policy or any part thereof at a later date
or dates. [Italics supplied.] In any mode of settlement pursuant to an agree-
ment of the insurer with a beneficiary the portion of each distribution which is to
be included in gross income shall be determined as follows:
"(a) Proceeds held by the insurer.-If the proceeds are held by the insurer
under an agreement with a beneficiary to distribute either the increment to such
proceeds currently, or the proceeds and increment in equal installments until both'
are exhausted, there shall be included in gross income, the increment so paid to
the beneficiary, or so credited to the fund in each year by the insurer.
"(b) Proce-eds payable in installments for a fixed number of years.-If, pur-
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Face Value of Policy ($100,000) --$5,141.39
Life Expectancy of Beneficiary on Basis of Mortality Tables
(19.45)
$5,141.39 x 10 (Number of Monthly payments received
during first taxable year) =_$_4,284.49
12 Months
$6,294.00 (Sum paid beneficiary, including $324 dividends)
4,284.49 (Admitted non-taxable income)
$2,009.51 (Sum claimed to be taxable)
The Commissioner also argues that the beneficiary, by electing
option C, entered into a new contract with the insurer and that the
part of the payments in excess of the amount payable in a lump sum
at the death of the insured is taxable. The sum left with the insurance
suant to such agreement, the proceeds are payable in installments for a fixed num-
ber of years, the amount that would have been payable by the insurance company
immediately upon the death of the insured (if payment at a later date had not
been provided for) is to be divided by the total number of installments payable over
the fixed number of years for which payment is to be made, and the quotient
represents the -portion of each installment to be excluded from gross income. The
amount of each installment in excess of such excluded .portion is to be included
in gross income. For example, if, at the insured's death, $1,000 would have been
payable in a single installment, but 10 equal annual payments are made in lieu
thereof, the portion of the installment received during any taxable year to be
excluded from gross income is $100 ($1,000 divided by 10). Any amount re-
ceived as an installment in excess of $100 is to be included in gross income.
"If the proceeds are payable in installments for a taxable year beginning after
December 31, 1941 to a spouse who was divorced or legally separated from the
insured under a court decree, such proceeds are to be excluded from" the income
of such spouse to the extent provided in the preceding paragraph only if not
required to be included in her gross income under section 22(k), relating to
alimony income. Thus, if under the terms of a divorce decree, an insurance
policy upon the life of the husband is to be purchased by him to provide a prin-
cipal sum of $10,000 payable upon his death in 10 annual installments, with in-
terest, to his divorced wife, the full amount of such installments received by the
wife, including the interest, is to be included in her income. See further section
22(b) (2), section 22(k), section 19.22(b) (2) (A)-4 and section 19.22(k)-i.
"'(c) Proceeds payable in installments during tie life of the beneficiary.-If,
pursuant to such agreement, the proceeds are payable in installments during the
life of the beneficiary the amount of each installment that is to be included in
gross income will be determined as in paragraph (b) of this section, except that
the number of years to be used in the specified computation will be determined
by the life expectancy of the beneficiary, as calculated by the table of mortality
used by "the particular insurance company in determining the amount of the
annuity.
"(d) Proceeds payable for a fixed number of years and for continued life.-If
pursuant to such agreement, the proceeds are payable in installments for a fixed
number of years and for continued life. the amount of each installment that is to
be included in gross income will be determined either as provided in paragraph
(b) of this section if the fixed number of years for which payment is to be made
exceeds the life expectancy of the beneficiary, as calculated by the table of mor-
tality used by the particular insurance company in determining the amount of the
annuity; or, as provided in paragraph (c) of this section if such life expectancy
exceeds the specified fixed period."
[Vol. 22
NOTES AND COMMENTS
company according to the Commissioner's contention, was in the nature
of a loan from which she received interest or compensation for the use
of the funds. Held, the installments are computed according to a sched-
ule contained in the policy. No part of them are denominated as inter-
est, but-unlike dividends-are payable whether the company earns
money or not. The rights flow from the policy granted the beneficiary
and are paid by reason of the death of the insured. Therefore, of the
$,294 received, only $324.00 in dividends is taxable.4
"While Congress has power to require inclusion in gross income
increments of moneys payable by reason of the maturing of life insur-
ance contracts by death of the insured, it has not done so under the
provisions of the Revenue Act of 1934." 5 The history of Congressional
action pertaining to insurance installments plainly shows that such
payments are to be exempt from taxation. Section 213(b) (1) of the
Revenue Act of 1924, and previous acts exempted: "(1) The proceeds
of life insurance policies paid upon the death of the insured." 6*
This provision was modified in the Revenue Act of 1926, Section
213(b) (1), which provided for the exclusion from gross income any
"Amounts received under a life insurance contract paid by reason of
the death of the insured, whether in a single sum or in install-
ments .... "7 The change in the 1926 Act was intended ". . . to pre-
vent any interpretation which would deny exemption in the case of
installments."8' The phrase "or otherwise" in the 1934 Act supplanted
"or in installments" in the Acts from 1926 through 1932 to make it clear
"... that the proceeds of a life insurance policy payable by reason of
the death of the insured in the form of an annuity are not includible
in gross income."9
"The Commissioner of Internal Revenue has authority to prescribe
rules and regulations to administer the Revenue Act of 1934 under
powers conferred upon him by Section 32 thereof. Any regulation con-
sistent with the law is valid and its promulgation a proper exercise
of the power conferred upon him, but it does not empower him to change
or alter the law.
"The power of an administrative officer or board to administer a
federal statute and to prescribe rules and regulations to that end is not
the power to make law ... but the power to *adopt regulations to carry
into effect the will of Congress as expressed by the statute. A regula-
'Pierce v. Com'r of Int. Rev., 2 T. C. No. 106 (1943).
'Allis v. LaBudde, 128 F. (2d) 838 (C. C. A. 7th, 1942).
'* 43 ST-T. 267 (1924). For a comparative analysis on the statutes covering
this point see BARTOX AXD BROW.NIX(G. FEDERAL INCOME AND ESTATE LAWS (7th
ed. 1936), p. 21.
744 STAT. 24 (1926).
8 Conference Report, H. R. 1, 69th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 33.
' Finance Committee Report No. 558, 73d Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 23.
1944)
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
tion which does not do this, but operates to create a rule out of har-
mony with the statute is a mere nullity."'1°
It is well settled under Section 22(b) (1) of the Internal Revenue
Code that amounts received under a life insurance contract paid by
reason of the death of the insured, whether in a single sum or other-
wise, are to be excluded from taxable gross income, pursuant to an
election of settlement option made by the insured prior to the maturity
of the policy." The principal case on this point is Com'r of Int. Rev.
v. Winslow. 12* In this case the X Insurance Society agreed, in con-
sideration of the payment of an annual premium of $2,569.44, to pay
the designated beneficiary [Winslow] $100,000 on receipt of notice of
the death of the insured. The insured selected an option providing for
payment in 50 annual installments of $2,000 each and also inserted a
"non-commutable clause." After payment of 13 premiums, the insured
died. The beneficiary surrendered the policy and received a bond pro-
viding for payment of 50 annual installments of $2,000 each. The in-
stallments also called for a three per cent interest rate. It was con-
ceded that the commutation of 50 annual installments of $2,000 each
on the date of the death, would be $53,000. Beneficiary received
$2,581.40 in 1934 and did not include this sum in his gross income.
Altogether he bad received from the insurer $45,473.40, representing
17 annual installments of $2,000 each, plus $11,473.40, being the total
of the additional payments each year. The Commissioner argued that
since the commuted value was $53,000, and that since $45,473.40 had
been received in prior years untaxed, under Treasury Regulations 86,
Section 22(b) (1), the difference of $7,526.60 representing tax free in-
come, must be spread over the remaining 33 years. This would leave
only $228.08 as the exempt portion of the $2,581.40 received during
1934. The Board of Tax Appeals held the $2,000 portion of the in-
stallments exempt under Section 22(1) (1) of the Revenue Act of
1934, as arising from the 'death of the insured, and $581.40 taxable as
income not arising because of the death of the insured. The Circuit
Court of Appeals upheld this decision, 'declaring Treasury Regulations
86 to be invalid insofar as inconsistent with this decision.
The language ". . . amounts received under a life insurance contract
1053 STAT. 32 (1939), 26 U. S. C. A. §62 (1940); Com'r of Int. Rev. v.
Winslow, 113 F. (2d) 418, 423 (C. C. A. 1st, 1940); Manhatten Co. v. Com'r of
Int. Rev., 297 U. S. 129, 134, 56 Sup. Ct. 397, 400, 80 L. ed. 528, 531 (1936).
" Kaufman v. U. S., 131 F. (2d) 854 (C. C. A. 4th, 1942) ; Com'r of Int. Rev.
v. Bartlett, 113 F. (2d) 766 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940) ; Com'r of Int. Rev. v. Buck, 41
B. T. A. 99 (1940), aff'd, 120 F. (2d) 775 (C. C. A. 2d, 1941).
2*39 B. T. A. 373 (1939), aff'd, 113 F. (2d) 418 (C. C. A. 1st, 1940). It
was on the basis of Section 22(b) (1) as interpreted by this decision that the court
held the $324 in the Pierce Case to be taxable. This income was paid as divi-
dends and was not received solely "by reason of the death of the insured."
[Vol. 22
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paid by reason of the death of the insured, whether in a single sum or
otherwise.. ." is to be interpreted in its ordinary and natural meaning.
13
It is specifically provided by statute that ". . . if such amounts
[premiums due the beneficiary] are held by the insurer under an agree-
ment to pay interest thereon, the interest payments shall be included
in gross income."'14 In the case of United States v. Heilbroner,5 the
policy provided that the insurers were to pay the defendant beneficiary
annual sums described either as "interest" or "annuity" payments with-
out dimunition of the corpus of the policy. Upon the death of the
defendant the insurers were to pay her children the face value of the
policy. The Commissioner refunded the money the beneficiary paid
on her return, holding that such sums were paid by the reason of the
death of the insured within the meaning of Section 22(b) (1) of the
Revenue Act of 1928. A new Commissioner demanded a return of
the money, which was refused; and an action was brought in the Fed-
eral Court to force a return. The Court held that the money was not
paid by reason of the death of the insured, but constituted interest, and
ordered a judgment in favor of the United States.
The same general rule applies to dividends received by the benefi-
ciary. In the case of Kinnear v. Con'r of Int. Rev.'6 the court held
dividends to be paid for reasons other than the death of the insured
to be fully taxable.
On the other hand the Revenue Department has ruled that "There
should ... be excluded from gross income not only the principal sum
or capital value of the life insurance policy as of the date of the death
of the insured but also any amounts added to such principal sum (when
it is paid in installments), pursuant to an option exercised by the
insured, by reason of the running of time."' 7 Similarly it has been held
that a small increase in each monthly installment payment after a cer-
tain date because of the discontinuance by the insurer of an adminis-
trative expense is excluded from gross income, the court holding such
to have been received under the insurance contract, or to have been a
gift exempt from taxation under Section 22(b) (3) of the Revenue
Act of 1934.18
In the case of Allis v. LaBudde'9 the beneficiary's husband carried
policies providing for monthly payment to the beneficiary for a period
of 10 years and thereafter during beneficiary's lifetime. The insured
"' Helvering v. San Joaquin Co., 297 U. S. 497, 56 Sup. Ct. 569, 80 L. ed.
824 (1936)."53 STAT. 10 (1939), 26 U. S. C. A. §22(b)(1) (1940).
' 100 F. (2d) 379 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938).
1620 B. T. A. 718 (1930).
1 General Counsel's Memorandum, 23523, 1943-6-11376.
" Com'r of Int. Rev. v. Bartlett, 113 F. (2d) 766 (C. C. A. 2d, 1940).
19128 F. (2d) 838 (C. C. A. 7th, 1942).
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died in 1918. Beneficiary did not include the installments paid after
the 10-year period during either 1934 or 1935. The Commissioner of
Internal Revenue attempted to include these sums in her gross income
under Regulations 86, Section 22(b)(1)-i; but the Circuit Court of
Appeals held this regulation to be inconsistent with the intent of Con-
gress and excluded these sums from gross income.
As a result of the Winslow Case, the Allis Case and other similar
cases, the Commissioner amended previous regulations. In "Regula-
tions One-Eleven," Section 29.22(b)(1)-i, as released October 28,
1943, the Commissioner provided that "In case of a beneficiary to whom
payments are made in installments pursuant to an option exercised by
such beneficiary, the amount exempted is the amount payable imme-
diately after the death of the insured had such beneficiary not elected
to exercise an option to receive the proceeds of the policy or any part
thereof at a later date or dates." The consistency of this regulation
with the statute as laid down by Congress was tested in the Pierce
Case, supra, and was declared inconsistent with Congressional intent
as laid down in the statute. Previously the same court had said:
"Whether such arrangement with the company was made by the bene-
ficiary or by the insured is regarded as immaterial." 20 * Without the
use of this dictum the court now said that by death of the insured the
beneficiary acquired one of several property rights, and in exercising
any of them, the right would spring from the policy.
21
Thus it appears that the Courts have consistently followed the will
of Congress that there shall be excluded from gross income ". .. amounts
received under a life insurance contract paid by reason of the death of
the insured, whether in a single sum or otherwise . ,,2 (Italics ours.)
Congress having provided for income taxation, it might be argued
that the Commissioner, through his Regulations, was attempting to
carry out the purpose of the Sixteenth Amendment, which authorizes
Congress to ". .. lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever
source derived, without apportionment among the several states, and
without regard to any census or enumeration. '23 (Italics ours.) In-
come may be defined as "that gain or recurrent benefit (usually meas-
ured in money) which proceeds from labor, business, or property."'z
(Italics ours.) The Federal Court has defined income as "all gain
from capital, labor, or-both."
25
20* Winslow v. Com'r of Int. Rev., 39 B. T. A. 373 (1939), in commenting upon
G. C. M. 13796, XIII-2 C. B. 41 (October 2, 1934).
2 Latterman v. Guardian Life Insurance Co., 280 N. Y. 102, 19 N. E. (2d)
978 (1939).
2253 STAT. 10 (1939), 26 U. S. C. A. §22(b) (1) (1940).23 U. S. Const. Amend. XVI.
24
WEBssrz's NEw INTERNATIONAL DIcTIoNARY (2nd ed.), p. 1258.2 In re Owl Drug Co., 21 Fed. Supp. 907, 909 (1937).
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Most policies have an option providing for immediate settlement
with the beneficiary upon the death of the insured. This sum, payable
immediately, may be called theoretically an investment, which is non-
taxable. However, upon exercising an option calling for installment
payments over a period of years, the sum total received is greater than
the amount receivable immediately upon the death of the insured. This
"gain" is in reality "income" on the "investment."
An illustrative example is as follows. Suppose the policy provides
for settlement with the beneficary under two options:
(1) The face value of the policy, $50,000, is to be paid immediately.
(2) Leaving the proceeds with the insurer, the insurer to pay 10
annual installments of $6,000 each.
As a result of choosing option (2) the beneficiary receives an extra
net non-taxable income of $10,000 over the 10-year period, or $1,000
annually. If the policy provided for a stipulated number of install-
ments, and an extension for life of the beneficiary provided his life
exceed the number of guaranteed installments, as in the Allis Case,
supra, any amounts received above the face value of the policy may be
regarded as income in economic usage and as a practical matter; and yet
remain non-taxable.
Under the Revenue Act of 1934 and subsequent laws the yearly in-
come received from an annuity is divided into two parts. Three per
cent of the cost of the annuity is included in gross income; and the
remainder, if any, is to be excluded. As soon as the aggregate amount
excluded equals the cost of the annuity, any sums received'thereafter
are to be included in gross income .2 * This rule also applies to life
insurance and endowment policies paid other than by reason of the
death of the insured. An exception to this rule is an annuity payable
to a wife in settlement of alimony, which is fully taxable.
The Court has defined an annuity ".... as a sum paid yearly or at
other specified intervals in return for the payment of a fixed sum by
the annuitant. The annuity itself is the totality of the payment to be
made under the contract."28  The Revenue Department has defined it
thus: "A stated sum payable periodically at stated times during life,
or a specified number of years under an obligation to make payments
in consideration of a gross sum paid for such obligation, which gross
sum is exhausted in the making of the periodic payments."29
20*53 STAT. 10 (1939), 26 U. S. C. A. §22(b) (2) (1940); Regulations One-
Eleven, Section 29.22(b) (2)-1. For a comparison of the law on this point see
BARTON AND BROWNING, FmEERAL INCOME AND ESTATE LAWS (7th ed., 1936), p. 21.
1 56 STAT. 816 (1942); 26 U. S. C. A. §22(k) (Supp. 1943); Regulations
One-Eleven, Section 2922(k)-i.2 Bodine v. Com'r of Int. Rev., 103 F. (2d) 982, 984 (C. C. A. 3rd, 1939).
2 General Counsel's Memorandum 21666, C. B. 1940-1, cited in Frackelton v.
Com'r of Int." Rev., 46 B. T. A. 883, 894 (1942).
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A somewhat similar treatment might be made in the case of insur-
ance installments. Rather than tax the sum total of the premiums paid
to the insurer at three per cent, a.tax might be levied on the cash value
of the policy at the time of the death of the insured, exempting all in-
come above three per cent taxable income until the excluded non-taxable
income reaches the 'face value of the policy. This plan in no way
would tax the corpus of the policy, but would be a tax on the income
only.
It is evident that Congress is leaving untouched an abundant source
of taxable income. In this era when every available source should be
tapped, it is suggested that Section 22(b) (1) be amended so as to
include sums paid above the value of the policy at the time of the death.
CECIL J. HILL.
Negligence-Res Ipsa Loquitur-Application to Unexplained
Airplane Accidents
In a recent North Carolina case of first impression the Supreme
Court refused to apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to an unex-
plained airplane accident. The facts of the case were that a passenger
invited by the pilot for a ride was injured when the plane crashed with-
out any apparent reason. Both the plaintiff and the pilot testified that
the plane went into a spin and crashed, and that neither had any knowl-
edge of the reason why. The Court said that "The 'doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur does not apply because any number of causes may have been
responsible for the plane falling, including causes over which the pilot
had absolutely no control, it being common knowledge that aeroplanes
do fall without the fault of the pilot."'
Translated literally, res ipsa toquitur means "the thing speaks for
itself." The doctrine had its origin in 1863 in an English case where
a barrel of flour fell from a second story window and injured the plain-
tiff.2  It involves the use of circumstantial evidence to establish the
plaintiff's case by allowing an inference or presumption of negligence
to arise from the circumstances of the accident itself. An accident re-
sulting in injury must be accompanied by surrounding circumstances
which, viewed in the light of the entire situation, give rise to an infer-
ence of negligence. From the layman's point of view it can be stated
as follows: "What is required is evidence from which reasonable men
may conclude that, upon the whole, it is more likely that there was
negligence than there was not." 3
The deirelopment of the doctrine has led to much confusion in
1 Smith v. Whitley, 223 N. C. 534, 535, 27 S. E. (2d) 442, 443 (1943).
2 Bryne v. Boadle, 2 H. & C. 722, 159 Eng. Rep. 299 (1863).
' PROSSER, TORTS (1941) §43.
[Vol. 22
